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NUREMBERG’S LEGACY WITHIN 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:  
PROSECUTIONS ARE HERE TO STAY 
BRIANNE MCGONIGLE LEYH

 
ABSTRACT 
A lasting legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals is the 
assertion that individuals are subjects of international law and should be 
held criminally responsible for perpetrating war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Building upon the Nuremberg legacy, the emergence 
and proliferation of modern international(ized) tribunals has ushered in a 
new era in international criminal justice, whereby states seek to end 
impunity for international crimes through criminal trials. This Article 
addresses the legacy of Nuremberg in transitional justice approaches. It 
examines the criticisms within the transitional justice field that criminal 
justice processes are generally ill-suited to address the social forces that 
characterize collective violence and the push away from criminal 
prosecutions towards other non-retributive processes. It argues that while 
post-conflict peacebuilding requires a more holistic transitional justice 
approach, recourse to at least some criminal prosecutions remains an 
enduring legacy of Nuremberg, supported by both international actors as 
well as victim communities.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern international criminal law dates back to the military tribunals 
established after World War II. The Allied Powers opted to hold trials 
rather than summarily execute their enemies. These trials were massive 
undertakings. The Prosecution at Nuremberg relied heavily on 
documentary evidence comprised of over 200,000 affidavits, in addition to 
testimony from 94 witnesses, including direct survivors, former SS 
members, camp guards and Nazi party members.
1
 The Tokyo Tribunal, on 
the other hand, had to rely on a greater amount of victim and witness 
 
 
  Dr. Brianne McGonigle Leyh is an Associate Professor at Utrecht University’s Netherlands 
Institute of Human Rights where she co-directs the Utrecht Centre for International Studies. She is also 
a Senior Counsel with the Public International Law & Policy Group. 
 1. See The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgment, 412 (Int’l Mil. Trib. Oct. 1, 1946), 
http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf.  
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testimony due to the fact that the Japanese destroyed most of their military 
records prior to their surrender. The Tribunal heard courtroom testimony 
from 416 witnesses and accepted unsubstantiated affidavits and 
depositions from an additional 779 individuals, including victims.
2
 The 
success of these military tribunals was due in large part to the legal teams 
that were assembled to prosecute the cases. Thousands of lawyers and 
support staff sifted through piles of evidence. Undoubtedly, a significant 
amount of financial resources were poured into both courts. 
As such, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have come to “represent the 
possibility of legal responses [to war crimes and mass atrocity], rather than 
responses grounded in sheer power politics or military aggression.”3 But 
the trials were not flawless. Commentators have criticized the fact that the 
proceedings operated without precedent, failed to recognize the crimes 
committed by Allied Powers, and curtailed the ability of the accused to 
access documents and conduct investigations.
4
 The proceedings have been 
criticized as slow, inconvenient, and expensive.
5
 Yet the moral weight that 
the judgments conveyed changed the world forever, giving “rise to a new 
vision of moral responsibility among nations.”6 The structure and 
approach of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, moreover, paved the way for 
and heavily influenced the shape of future international(ized) courts and 
domestic responses to serious human rights violations.
7
 The jurisprudence 
that emerged from the proceedings also aided in the further development 
of international norms.
8
 Most importantly, the legacy of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials is the understanding and general acceptance of the notion 
that individuals are subjects of international law and should be held 
 
 
 2. BRIANNE MCGONIGLE LEYH, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE? VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 136 (2011); see John Danaher, The Illusion of Legality? 
Post-WWII Military Tribunals in the Far East, 1 CORK O. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006).  
 3. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 27 (1998). 
 4. Id. at 30. 
 5. Thane Rosenbaum, The Romance of Nuremberg and the Tease of Moral Justice Legacy, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1731, 1733 (2005–2006). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Michael G. Karnavas, Association President, Ass’n of Def. Counsel ICTY Practicing Before 
the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Nuremberg—60 Years After: The Beginning 
and Development of International Criminal Justice (Nov. 10–12, 2006), available at 
http://www.michaelgkarnavas.net/files/Nuremberg_speech_MGKarnavas_10Nov2006.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2016). The term international(ized) includes international courts such as the ICTY, ICTR and 
ICC as well as hybrid courts that are sometimes referred to as internationalized courts such as the 
ECCC and SCSL, amongst others. 
 8. Id. 
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criminally responsible for perpetrating war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and (later) genocide.
9
 
This Article argues that the legacy of Nuremberg is reflected not only 
in the proliferation of international and hybrid criminal courts from the 
early 1990s until today, but also in the development of the notion within 
international human rights law of a state’s duty to investigate, prosecute, 
and punish international crimes, as well as the continued demand from 
both international actors and victim populations for criminal prosecutions 
within transitional processes. The Article will address the criticism that 
criminal justice processes are generally ill-suited to address the social 
forces that characterize collective violence. Additionally, the Article will 
discuss the push within the transitional justice field away from criminal 
prosecutions and towards other less retributive responses. There has 
always been a pendulum swing with regard to criminal trials for mass 
atrocity crimes. At times there has been a strong enthusiasm for 
implementing criminal prosecutions, but this eagerness typically yields to 
political pragmatism. This Article explores this pendulum swing by 
examining the lasting legacy of Nuremberg within transitioning societies 
as shown, for example, by the growing number of trials in Argentina for 
crimes committed by its military from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. It 
concludes by showing that recourse to criminal prosecutions remains a 
favored response despite efforts to minimize the importance of the 
criminal justice paradigm. This emphasis, both locally and internationally, 
on holding individuals criminally accountable for mass atrocity crimes is 
the lasting legacy of Nuremberg. This legacy is now firmly imbedded in 
integrated transitional justice responses.  
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF INTERANTIONAL(IZED) CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS  
Following the military trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the UN sought 
to codify the Nuremberg principles and looked into the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court. However, such a court was not to 
be. Cold War realities meant the idea would be shelved (though the 
 
 
 9. An amendment on the crime of aggression, prosecuted as crimes against peace before the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, has been adopted by consensus at the International Criminal Court’s 
2010 Kampala Review Conference and is now open to ratification by States Parties. U.N. Secretary-
General, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Adoption of 
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8 (June 11, 2010). For 
those states that ratify the amendment, the ICC will have jurisdiction of this crime no earlier than 
January 1, 2017. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 15, sec. 3, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.  
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International Law Commission (ILC) continued to work on the idea) until 
the political situation once again became open to the possibility of holding 
individuals accountable for international crimes.  
In response to the violence and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, and almost 50 years following Nuremberg, the United Nation’s 
Security Council, pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, established the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR). The ad hoc tribunals, as they became known because of 
their specific mandates and temporary nature, were the first of their kind. 
The connection between Nuremberg and these tribunals is widely 
recognized. For example, in the ICTY’s first trial, the prosecutors and 
judges referenced Nuremberg in applying legal and moral standards.
10
 
Building on the work of the ad hoc tribunals, within a few years and after 
decades of work by the ILC, states adopted the Rome Statute establishing 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998. After the required 
number of state ratifications, the ICC became operational on July 1, 2002. 
Preparatory documents clearly show how the establishment of the ICC 
was undoubtedly part of the legacy of Nuremberg,
11
 while the mounting 
case law of the Court continues to underscore the Nuremberg Principles in 
practice.  
In addition to these international courts, several countries implemented 
a new type of court, hybrid tribunals, to prosecute genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. Hybrid courts have been established for 
East Timor (Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC)), Sierra Leone 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)), Cambodia (Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)), Kosovo (UNMIK/ 
EULEX War Crimes Panels), and Lebanon (Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL)).
12
 Like the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, each of these courts carries on 
 
 
 10. The ICTY continued to reference Nuremberg throughout its operations. See Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 200 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 
1999). In the ICTY’s Outreach Program’s Global Legacy Conference Report from 2011, Nuremberg 
was mentioned no less than 41 times. See ICTY Global Legacy: Conference Proceedings, Nov. 15–16, 
2011, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/conferences_pub/global_legacy_publication_ 
en.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Apr. 3-
13,1995, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/2 (Apr. 21, 1995); Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of 
an Int’l Criminal Court, Apr. 3–13, Aug. 14–25, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/22), 5 (Sept. 6, 1995); Rep. of 
the Int’l Law Comm. on the work of its forty-fifth sess., May 3–July 23, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/48/10; 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm. on the work of its forty-fifth sess., May 2–July 22, 1994, A/49/10; 
Twelfth Rep. on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Sec. of Mankind, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/460 (Apr. 15, 1994).  
 12. For the SCSL see Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, attached to the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/8
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the legacy of Nuremberg by seeking to end impunity for the commission 
of international crimes. Hybrid courts play a pivotal role in the 
enforcement of international criminal law and remind states of the shared 
responsibility for the investigation, prosecution and punishment of serious 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
13
 Indeed, it is this shared 
responsibility for prosecution where Nuremberg has had a tremendous 
impact on the domestic prosecution of international crimes.  
III. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE  
Although the Nuremberg legacy did not immediately increase the 
frequency of criminal trials for international crimes, it was part of a 
growing body of soft and hard law emphasizing the importance of criminal 
prosecutions.
14
 Along with the adoption of the Nuremberg Principles, the 
Genocide Convention,
15
 the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
16
 Protocols I 
 
 
Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002); for SPSC in Dili, Timor-Leste see S.C. 
Res.1272, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1272 ( Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing UNTAET); UNTAET Reg. 2000/30 
(Sept. 25, 2000), on Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure (as amended by UNTAET Reg. 2001/25 
(Sept. 14, 2001)) and on January 1, 2006, a new Code of Criminal Procedure of Timor-Leste, Law No. 
15/2005 of 16 September 2005, replaced UNTAET Reg. 2000/30; S.C. Res.1244, UN Doc. 
S/Res/1244 (1999); for the UNMIK / EULEX war crimes panels in Kosovo see The Kosovo Court 
System Was Based Partly on UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 from Dec. 12, 1999 and partly on the 
Constitutional Framework; in April 2009, the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
took over the operational role of UNMIK with regard to rule of law; Council of the European Union, 
Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo; EULEX 
Kosovo, Feb. 4, 2008; Kosovo, Law No. 03/L-053, On the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case 
Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo; Kosovo, Law No. 03/L-052, On the Special 
Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo; for the STL operating in The Hague, Netherlands see 
S.C. Res.1757, Attachment to the Annexed Agreement to Resolution 1757, Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1757 (May 30, 2007); for the ECCC in Cambodia see 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea ( June 6, 2003); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
(2004).  
 13. ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2008). 
 14. Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law, 8 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT’L L. 595, 600 
(1999) (tracing the creation of treaties prohibiting genocide, torture, and war crimes back to the 
Nuremberg Principles). 
 15. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 16. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva 
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
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and II of 1977,
17
 and the Convention against Torture all codified specific 
international crimes.
18
 This codification, coupled with the passage of the 
Nuremberg Principles, indicates that states recognize the importance of 
criminalizing certain acts and reinforces the idea that individuals who 
commit those acts should be held accountable, either domestically or 
internationally.
19
 Prior to the proliferation of international and hybrid 
criminal courts, criminal prosecutions remained the sole prerogative of 
states, and there was no general agreement over whether states had a duty 
to prosecute serious human rights or humanitarian law violations.
20
 
Not until the matter came before the Inter-American human rights 
system did the notion of a duty to prosecute emerge from the notion of a 
right to a remedy under human rights law. The Inter-American human 
rights system played a significant role in expanding international human 
rights obligations in this respect.
21
 In 1988, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) issued a landmark decision in the Velásquez 
Rodríguez case.
22
 The Court concluded that Article 1(1) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights has a criminal law component, requiring 
states to investigate grave violations of human rights.
23
 The duty to 
investigate, it found, is closely connected with the right of victims to know 
all the facts surrounding the disappearance of their loved ones. As a result, 
 
 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. Certain acts are specified in the 
Geneva Conventions as “grave breaches.” See First Geneva Convention, arts. 49–50; Second Geneva 
Convention, arts. 50–51; Third Geneva Convention, arts. 129–30; Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 
146–47. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to conflicts of a non-international 
nature. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, art. 3. 
 17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. Protocol I also identifies acts which are classified as “grave breaches.” See 
Protocol I, arts. 11, 85, 86. 
 18. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 19. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. REV. 2537, 2551–95 (1991) (though it should be noted that the Convention 
against Torture did not call for criminal accountability). 
 20. Id. at 2551.  
 21. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, 
Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 321, 361 (1994); Brian D. 
Tittemore, Ending Impunity in the Americas: The Role of the Inter-American Human Rights System in 
Advancing Accountability for Serious Crimes Under International Law, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 429 
(2006). 
 22. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (July 29, 1988). 
 23. Id. See also Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Jan. 20, 
1989); Fairen Garbi et al. v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Mar. 15, 1989).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/8
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in this case and others, the Court implicitly linked the duty to investigate 
with the right to truth.
24
  
However, in this case, the Court declined to require criminal 
proceedings as requested by the victims’ families. Thus it remained 
unclear whether Velásquez-Rodriguez required states to initiate criminal 
prosecutions, or whether other non-criminal investigations would suffice. 
Later, the Court clarified its position in a number of subsequent cases.
25
 
Interpreting the general obligation of states to give effect to the 
Convention, together with the right to an effective remedy, the Court 
found a duty to investigate and prosecute in cases concerning the right to 
life and personal integrity.
26
 The Court held that victims have the right to 
state investigation of crimes, state prosecution of those suspected of 
perpetrating the offense, and state punishment of those found guilty of the 
criminal act.
27
 While these decisions only relate to the Inter-American 
regional system, the world took notice. The European Court of Human 
Rights would later arrive at a similar conclusion, and held that states have 
a duty to investigate serious human rights violations, particularly right to 
life violations.
28
 However, the European Court of Human Rights has not 
yet found there is a duty to prosecute. 
 
 
 24. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (July 29, 1988); 
see also Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 201 (Nov. 25, 
2000); Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 48 (Mar. 14, 2001); Castillo 
Páez v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 90 (Nov. 3, 1997) (linking the right to truth with 
the state’s duty to investigate).  
 25. See Paniagua-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ( Mar. 8, 
1998); Durand & Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ( Aug. 16, 2000); Genie 
Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ( Jan. 29, 1997); Blake v. Guatemala, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ( Jan. 24, 1998); Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ( Nov. 19, 1999); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (serc. C) ( Nov. 25, 2000); see also Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of 
Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1399, 1417–18 (2002). 
 26. See Paniagua-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Mar. 8, 
1998); Durand & Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Aug. 16, 2000); Genie 
Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Jan. 29, 1997); Blake v. Guatemala, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Jan. 24, 1998); Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Nov. 19, 1999); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Nov. 25, 2000); dee also Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of 
Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1399, 1417–18 (2002).  
 27.  Paniagua-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, ¶ 155-56; Durand & Ugarte, ¶ 130; Genie Lacayo, 
¶ 76; Villagrán Morales, ¶ 227; Bámaca Velásquez, ¶ 182-83; La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 160 (Nov. 29, 2006); Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 131 (Sept. 22, 2006). 
 28.  McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995); 
Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).  
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In addition to the regional human rights courts, the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (Convention on Enforced Disappearance) became the first 
core human rights treaty to explicitly note the duty to investigate and 
prosecute.
29
 Article 3 recognizes a state’s duty to investigate alleged 
violations by non-state actors, and Article 6 holds that states must make 
necessary measures to hold perpetrators criminally responsible. Moreover, 
Article 11 further recognizes the obligation of states to criminally 
prosecute those suspected of being responsible for enforced 
disappearances. Likewise, despite no mention of a duty to prosecute in 
their relevant treaties, human rights treaty bodies, such as the Human 
Rights Committee, have come to interpret their treaties as requiring a duty 
to prosecute for a specific set of crimes.
30
 Similarly, in 2004, the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL emphasized the obligation to prosecute specific 
categories of crimes in one of its judgments, ruling out options for 
amnesty.
31
  
As such, there is general consensus amongst states that even when 
national jurisdictions acknowledge amnesties for some human rights 
violations, amnesties for codified serious human rights violations, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide will not be recognized at 
the international level,
32
 and should not be recognized at the domestic 
level.
33
 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has 
consistently questioned the appropriateness of amnesties in Latin 
American political transitions,
34
 and even when countries had created a 
 
 
 29. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 23, 2010). 
 30. Human Rights Council, Boucherf v. Algeria, Communication 1196/2003, Views of 27 April 
2006, ¶ 11; Bousroual v. Algeria, Communication 992/2001, Views of 24 April 2006, ¶ 11; Celal v. 
Greece, Communication 1235/2003, Views of 11 November 2004, ¶ 6.2; Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, 
Communication 1250/2004, Views of 5 September 2006, ¶ 9.3; Mulezi v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Communication 962/2001, Views of 23 July 2004, ¶ 7; Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Communication 
950/2000, Views of 31 July 2003, ¶ 11; General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 15, 18. 
 31. Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL04-15-PT-141, Decision on Preliminary Motion on the 
Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of the Special Court, ¶ 10 (May 25, 2004). 
 32. See Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN 
LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (2001), available at https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf; 
Lisa P. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, 
49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 971–75 (2009); Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 
25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283, 297–323 (2007); Louise Mallinder, Can Amnesties and International 
Justice be Reconciled?, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 208–30 (2007).  
 33. See Laplante, supra note 32.  
 34. See, e.g., Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 105 (1996); Consuelo v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss4/8
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truth commission to investigate crimes, it stated that these non-criminal 
investigations were “not enough.”35 The Inter-American system decisions 
have underpinned the principle of individual criminal responsibility for 
serious human rights violations.
36
 Despite the fact that states continue to 
recognize amnesties for serious human rights violations, largely to secure 
peace,
37
 there remains little recognition at the international level, and the 
state could be found in breach of their obligations to investigate, prosecute 
and punish either under a regional system or within a treaty-body process. 
Promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels is a 
key aspect of the United Nations’ mission. It has a long history of 
strengthening criminal law processes around the world.
38
 While embracing 
integrated and complementary approaches within transitional justice 
responses, the United Nations continues to emphasize the important role 
that criminal trials can play in transitional contexts.
39
 It not only supports 
the ad hoc tribunals (i.e. SPSC, ECCC, and STL), it also pumps millions 
of dollars into supporting domestic criminal processes for serious crimes.
40
 
These combined regional and international developments, together with 
the proliferation of the international criminal tribunals, reinforced 
arguments that there is a legal norm that the most egregious international 
crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
require investigation, prosecution and punishment. The Nuremberg 
 
 
10.262, 10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 ¶ 50 (1992–
93); Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, 10.375, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 ¶ 54 (1992–93); Massacre Las Hojas 
v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 26/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, at 83 
(1992–93); IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 31 
¶ 15-27 (Mar. 12, 1993), available at http://iachr.org/countryrep/Peru93eng/background.htm#f.%20 
Impunity; 1985–1986 Annual Report, ch. IV, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/ 
85.86eng/chap.4.htm. 
 35. Garay Hermosilla, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, ¶ 77. 
 36. See Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, In Search of Coherent Jurisprudence for International 
Criminal Law: Correlating Universal Human Responsibilities with Universal Human Rights, 29 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 157, 204 (2006). 
 37. For instance, amnesties have been included as part of peace processes in Sudan (Sudan Peace 
Agreement of 21 April 1997), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement) 
and Sierra Leone (Lome Peace Agreement of 8 July 1999), as well as in Argentina, El Salvaldor, 
Guatemala, amongst others. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State responsibility to investigate and prosecute 
grave human rights violations in international law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 458–61 (1990). 
 38. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has played a significant role in criminal law 
reforms around the world. 
 39. U.N. Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies, S/2004/616, art. XII, ¶ 39 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
 40. Rupert Skilbeck, Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials, 15 HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 
1, 1–5 (2009).  
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precedent echoed throughout all of these developments, calling again and 
again on states to ensure criminal accountability.  
IV. CRITICISMS OF A CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROACH 
The legal pendulum has therefore often swung in favor of criminal 
prosecutions for serious human rights and humanitarian law violations. 
Yet, despite what seems to be a preference for criminal justice responses 
following serious human rights abuses, criminal justice processes have 
always and faced strong criticism in the literature.
41
 The criticism is 
particularly loud, and the picture particularly bleak, for instances of 
collective violence and mass victimization.  
Already in 1963, Shklar asserted that a criminal justice paradigm is ill-
suited to address situations of collective violence.
42
 Fletcher and Weinstein 
similarly argue that trials of individuals accused are ill-equipped to 
accurately reflect contemporary conflict.
43
 Criminal prosecutions are too 
easily susceptible to political manipulation and instrumentalization of the 
law.
44
 Such manipulation could lead to selective prosecutions that focus 
neither on the real perpetrators nor the real crimes. Moreover, since most 
trials focus on a narrow set of violations, namely violations of bodily 
integrity (i.e. murder, torture, rape) or property rights, they fail to address 
the full range of harms suffered by victims and victim communities such 
as violations of economic and social rights.
45
 This failure to focus on the 
needs and concerns of victims, and their inability to effectively respond to 
mass atrocity, has led to calls for other non-retributive responses. As noted 
by Laplante, “‘[t]he original strong link of justice to criminal trials 
 
 
 41. In the Amnesty Law Database Queen’s University Belfast and the Arts & Humanities 
Research Council provide information on over 500 amnesties in 138 countries. The Amnesty Law 
Database, QUEEN’S UNIV. BELFAST, http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/Amnesty/about.html (last visited 
May 3, 2016). 
 42. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORAL AND POLITICAL TRIALS 112 (Boston, 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1963).  
 43. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 579 (2002). 
 44. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 418–19 (2003) 
(on the politics of defendant selection before the Tokyo tribunal). 
 45. See Dustin N. Sharp, Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a 
Positive-Peace Paradigm for Transitional Justice, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 780 (2012); Amanda 
Cahill-Ripley, Foregrounding Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice: Realising Justice for 
Violations of Economic and Social Rights, 32 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 183, 184 (2014). 
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spearheaded by Nuremberg was weakened by an ‘an increased pragmatism 
in and politicization of the law.”’46  
The outcome has been transitional justice literature examining more 
fully the validity of alternative justice mechanisms, such as truth 
commissions,
47
 which has resulted in a broadening of transitional justice 
responses and the belief that criminal prosecutions, even if there is a duty 
to prosecute, are inadequate on their own or misplaced entirely in some 
situations.
48
 This period of scholarly debate within the transitional justice 
field assisted in elevating the status of truth commissions from a “second-
best” alternative to a mechanism at least as important as criminal justice in 
the transitional justice movement.
49
 In particular, “[t]he South African 
experience not only helped make truth commissions a part of popular 
culture, but also simultaneously created the inference that amnesties are an 
acceptable feature of transitional justice.”50 Truth commissions and 
commissions of inquiry are often touted as being better suited to address 
collective accountability and mass victimization. Indeed, they remain a 
popular choice. To date, the United States Institute for Peace, in its Truth 
Commission Digital Collection, has profiled over 30 truth commissions 
and 12 commissions of inquiry from 1974 to the present.
51
 
For Chilean human rights lawyer, José Zalaquett, “the real question is 
to adopt, for every specific situation, the measures that are both feasible 
and most conducive to the purpose of contributing to build or reconstruct a 
 
 
 46. Laplante, supra note 32, at 926 (citing Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 70 (2003)).  
 47. Timothy Phillips & Mary Albon, When Prosecution Is Not Possible: Alternative Means of 
Seeking Accountability for War Crimes, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 244 (Belinda 
Cooper ed., 1999). 
 48. See Tricia D. Olson, Leigh A. Payne & Andrew G. Reiter, The Justice Balance: When 
Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 980 (2010). 
 49. See Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and 
Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228 (2007) (addressing the elevated 
status of truth commissions in transitional justice); Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should 
Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 
EMORY L.J. 205, 220 (2000) (arguing against the duty to prosecute in all situations). 
 50. Laplante, supra note 32, at 929 (citing Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo Van der Merwe, 
Introduction: Assessing the South African Transitional Justice Model, in TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER? 1, 8 (Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo Van der Merwe eds., 
2008)); see also Catherine Jenkins, They Have Built a Legal System Without Punishment: Reflections 
on the Use of Amnesty in the South African Transition, 64 TRANSFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSP. S. 
AFR. 27, 31 (2007). 
 51. U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TRUTH COMMISSION DIGITAL COLLECTION, available at 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-digital-collection (last visited May 3, 2016).  
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just order.”52 And, while this may ring true for many working in the field 
of transitional justice, it contrasts sharply with the principled legal 
obligation to prosecute. Minow, a renowned scholar and proponent of non-
retributive forms of justice, described supporters of criminal justice as 
idealists who espouse “stirring but often shrill and impractical claims, such 
as the ‘duty to prosecute’” and who are too remote from nations struggling 
with transitional justice.
53
 Yet Minow’s account perhaps too easily 
overlooks internal divisions within nations and the fact that very often 
local actors, especially victims, do not easily compromise their demands 
for criminal justice.
54
  
V. THE ENDURING LEGACY OF NUREMBERG: A DESIRE FOR CRIMINAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
These demands for criminal accountability may be driven by the 
authoritative acknowledgment of harm suffered in a forum that publically 
calls upon concrete and individual, rather than abstract and collective, 
responsibility. Drumbl asserts that trials have an expressive value in that 
they function as communicative bodies, pronouncing on the moral wrongs 
and narrating an official history, while also reinforcing respect for the rule 
of law.
55
 Trials, he holds, often transcend notions of “retribution and 
deterrence in claiming as a central goal the crafting of historical narratives, 
their authentication as truths, and their pedagogical dissemination to the 
public.”56 This communicative function of trials for atrocity crimes may in 
fact be one of the main reasons for its enduring legacy. To be sure, from 
expressing public denunciation of the acts to de-legitimizing extremist 
elements, trials do more than simply pronounce upon the guilt of a few 
accused. 
Some have called this impetus for criminal prosecution of serious 
human rights violations a Western-imposed process.
57
 But, when looking 
at the pendulum swinging between criminal prosecutions and non-
retributive responses, it is important to note that there have been a number 
 
 
 52. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights 
Violations: An Interview with José Zalaquett, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: 
GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 195, 197 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999). 
 53. MINOW, supra 3, at 28.  
 54. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 49, at 241–42. 
 55. See MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY AND PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 223–24 (1995); see also DRUMBL, supra note 55.  
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of growing international grassroots movements challenging amnesties and 
the “pervasive practice of impunity.”58 While some have been more 
successful than others, anthropologists and criminologists have shown 
through their research that victims and victim communities outside of the 
West often yearn for trials, long after elites compromise on criminal 
justice.  
In South Africa, for example, the law endorsed truth and reconciliation 
coupled with impunity.
59
 While the international community has lauded its 
truth commission as a model for future transitional justice response,
60
 
many victims in South Africa have been calling for retribution.
61
 Wilson 
highlights the “large gap” between political reality and victims’ 
expectations of justice, with the vast majority of victims having had a 
preference for prosecution and punishment.
62
 In Latin America, many 
states once protective of their amnesty provisions have now sought the 
course of criminal prosecutions due in large part to victim mobilization. 
Peru, Chile, and Argentina are just a few examples.
63
 The example of 
Argentina is particularly compelling in this regard. After years of 
reluctance to prosecute individuals for crimes committed during its “Dirty 
War,”64 since 2003 the country is now undertaking hundreds of 
prosecutions, largely initiated by civil society organizations, for serious 
human rights violations.
65
 Similarly, domestic prosecutions for serious 
 
 
 58. Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal 
Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 591, 593, 595 (1998) 
(noting, at that time, the rarity of criminal prosecutions since Nuremberg).  
 59. PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION ACT 34 OF 1995, http://www.justice. 
gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2016). 
 60. For an overview of research on the TRC in South Africa, see Annelies Verdoolaege, The 
Debate on Truth and Reconciliation: A Survey of Literature on the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 5 J. LANG. & POL. 15–35 (2006).  
 61. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Truth and Justice: Unfinished Business in South Africa (Feb. 
2003), available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/truthandjustice.htm; International 
Center for Transitional Justice, Family Seeks Justice in South Africa for Anti-Apartheid Activist 32 
Years after her Torture and Disappearance (May 20, 2015), https://www.ictj.org/news/justice-south-
africa-anti-apartheid-activist-disappearance; Long Battle for Truth in South Africa for Apartheid 
Victim’s Family, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-
3476166/Long-battle-truth-S-Africa-apartheid-victims-family.html.  
 62. RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 25 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).  
 63. Laplante, supra note 32, at 976–78.  
 64. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Reluctant Partner: The Argentine Government’s Failure to Back 
Trials of Human Rights Violations (2001), available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/ 
argentina/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
 65. Joint Workshop, Concluding Report, Forty years on from Operation Condor: Justice without 
Borders, available at http://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/Informe%20Taller%20 
borrador%201%20EN.pdf (last visited May 3, 2016). 
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human rights violations are being taken up in Africa, with the Central 
African Republic, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal all pursuing 
domestic, and in the case of Senegal, even regionalized, prosecution of 
international crimes.
66
 
Furthermore, though justice may not be a top priority following armed 
conflict,
67
 more than two-thirds of respondents from a 2007 population-
based survey in northern Uganda indicated that they wanted individuals 
guilty of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations to be held 
accountable. Many of the respondents recognized formal justice 
mechanisms, both international and national, as an appropriate response.
68
 
In fact, there are a number of population-based studies that show that in 
many post-conflict communities there is a broad desire to hold individuals 
accountable in a formal criminal process. For instance, responses from a 
2008 population-based survey from the eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) suggested that respondents believed justice could be 
achieved (80 percent), endorsing the national court system (51 percent), 
the International Criminal Court (26 percent), military courts (15 percent), 
and traditional/customary justice mechanisms (15 percent) as the main 
structures for achieving “justice.”69 There was little support for no trials at 
all (8 percent) and a strong preference (85 percent) for trials to take place 
in the DRC, whether national or internationalized.
70
 Likewise, in a 2009 
population-based survey from Cambodia, 70 percent of respondents 
indicated that members of the Khmer Rouge regime should be held 
accountable for the crimes committed, with 49 percent indicating the 
accountability should be through a criminal process.
71
 More recently, in 
October of this year, after 52 years of civil war, the Colombian people 
narrowly rejected a peace deal reached between the Colombian 
government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
 
 
 66. See Sarah Williams, The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts, 11 J. 
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AND THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 34 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447662. 
 68. PHUONG PHAM ET AL., WHEN THE WAR ENDS, supra note 67, at 34, available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1448368. 
 69. PATRICK VINCK ET AL., LIVING WITH FEAR: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES 
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Some have argued that the deal was defeated because voters felt it was too 
lenient on the rebels and that a greater number of criminal prosecutions 
were necessary.
72
 All sides must now return to renegotiate another 
agreement. These surveys and the failed peace agreement in Colombia, 
together with many attempts at domestic and international prosecutions, 
demonstrate that when given a choice, many victim populations desire 
criminal prosecutions. Given these statistics, it is unsurprising that trials 
remain favored responses in post-conflict societies, supported by many 
individuals as well as international actors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a discipline, transitional justice has evolved a great deal in the last 
few decades. Although its beginnings were largely about transitions to 
democracy with a focus on legal-institutional reform and retributivism,
73
 
transitional justice is now seen as an essential aspect of any liberal peace-
building program with a broader mandate.
74
 There is an entire “transitional 
justice industry,” complete with experts, funders, work packages and 
standard-setting,
75
 that aims to address past wrongs in order to better 
prepare for a stable future. While the pendulum continues to swing 
between calls for retributive responses and calls for alternative responses, 
the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and other 
donors have openly called for more integrated responses,
76
 utilizing a 
number of transitional justice measures. As such, transitional justice is 
moving away from a narrow retributive justice focus and is now 
embracing a broader range of approaches to contribute toward a 
sustainable peace following a period of serious human rights abuse or 
conflict. However, despite the fact that transitional justice has 
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conceptually expanded from a narrow focus on transitions to democracy, 
largely stressing retributive justice goals through formalistic legal 
responses, to a broader emphasis on social justice concerns, the allure and 
importance of criminal prosecutions remain.  
The continued desire to resort to the criminal justice paradigm has 
much to do with the success of Nuremberg. The Nuremberg and Tokyo 
military tribunals sought to use the rule of law to prosecute and punish 
those believed to be responsible for serious crimes. The Nuremberg 
precedent “was one of the great heroic and romantic moments of the 
twentieth century. It offered a glimpse as to what moral justice might look 
like, implemented in response to the world’s greatest known atrocity, at a 
time when humanity failed so miserably.”77 This desire to hold individuals 
criminally responsible in societies transitioning out of conflict will 
continue into the future, as evidenced by increasing calls for criminal 
accountability both from victims as well as from international actors.  
 
 
 77. Rosenbaum, supra note 5, at 1732. 
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